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MIRANDA'S FAILURE TO RESTRAIN
PERNICIOUS INTERROGATION PRACTICES
Welsh S. White*

As Yale Kamisar's writings on police interrogation demonstrate,1
our simultaneous commitments to promoting law enforcement's inter
est in obtaining confessions and to protecting individuals from over
reaching interrogation practices have created a nearly irreconcilable
tension. If the police must be granted authority to engage in effective
questioning of suspects, it will obviously be difficult to insure that "the
terrible engine of the criminal law . . . not . . . be used to overreach in
dividuals who stand helpless against it."2 If we are committed to ac
commodating these conflicting interests, however, some means must
be found to impose appropriate restraints on the police when they en
gage in interrogation.
The Warren Court undoubtedly believed that Miranda's safe
guards would impose significant restraints on the police, ensuring that
suspects subjected to custodial interrogation would not only be in
formed of their constitutional rights but also protected against coer
cive interrogation practices. Indeed, when Miranda was decided, it was
widely believed that the Court had imposed inordinate restraints on
the police. In his Miranda dissent, Justice White asserted that there
was "every reason to believe that a good many criminal defendants
who otherwise would have been convicted on what this Court has pre
viously thought to be the most satisfactory kind of evidence will
now . . . either not be tried at all or will be acquitted."3
Other commentators went further, even suggesting that the Court's
decision would have the effect of "very nearly" eliminating the
" 'confession' as an effective . . . tool [of] . . . law enforcement."4 Based
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. B.A. Harvard University, 1962; L.L.B.
University of Pennsylvania Law School, 1965. Ed. I would like to thank Yale Kamisar and
Richard Leo for helpful comments they made on an earlier draft of this article and Douglas
McKechnie and Gary Regan for excellent research assistance.
-

1. Yale Kamisar, What is an "Involuntary" Confession? Some Comments on lnbau and
Reid's Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728, 732 (1963), re
printed in y ALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN L Aw
AND POLICY 3-4 (1980) [hereinafter KAMISAR, ESSAYS].
2. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., plurality opinion),
quoted in KAMISAR, ESSAYS, supra note 1 , at 13.
3. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 542 (1966) (White, J., dissenting).
4. Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Overrule" Miranda?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 883,
900 (2000) (quoting position paper issued by candidate Richard M. Nixon during the 1968
presidential campaign).
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on their assessments of Miranda's probable impact, conservative crit
ics generally had no doubt that Miranda should be overruled,5 a view
that precipitated 18 U.S.C. § 3501, the statute considered in
Dickerson.6

By the time the Rehnquist Court decided Dickerson· more than
thirty years later, however, conservatives' perception of Miranda had
fundamentally changed. In a revealing portion of the Dickerson opin
ion, Justice Rehnquist seemed to indicate that the Court would not
"agree with Miranda's reasoning and resulting rule" if it "were . . . ad
dressing the issue in the first instance."7 In upholding Miranda against
constitutional attack, however, he stated that "principles of stare deci
sis weigh heavily against overruling it now."8
But if a majority of the Court disagreed with Miranda's constitu
tional holding, why should it reject an opportunity to overrule or at
least modify the Warren Court's landmark decision? As the majority
itself acknowledged,9 stare decisis has not been an impediment to over
ruling other constitutional decisions, Did the Dickerson Court refuse
to consider overruling Miranda's constitutional holding simply be
cause, as Justice Rehnquist put it, the Miranda "warnings have be
come part of our national culture?" 1 0 Or did Miranda survive because
the Court considered the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3501 "at the
very moment when the [C]ourt's interest in protecting its constitu
tional turf against'Congressional incursions was at a peak unmatched
in recent years"? 1 1
Identifying the motives underlying the Court's decision in
Dickerson is, of course, impossible. In my judgment, however, a major
reason for the Court's disinclination to overrule Miranda relates to
Miranda's limitations. By the time the Court confronted the issue in
Dickerson, it had become obvious that, regardless of what the Warren
Court might have intended, Miranda's safeguards provide very limited
restraints on police interrogators.
To some extent, of course, Miranda's limitations may be attributed
to post-Miranda decisions. As previous commentators have pointed
out,1 2 decisions by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have substantially

5. See id. at 894-906.

6. Id.
7. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (2000).
8. Id.
9. See id.
10. Id.
1 1 . Linda Greenhouse, A Turf Battle's Unlikely Victim: Dislike of Miranda Ruling Fell
Prey to Desire to Win a Bigger War, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2000, at A20.
12. See Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern Interrogators '
Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397, 407
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weakened Miranda's protections. Indeed, as interpreted by the pres
ent Court, Miranda essentially provides suspects with just two safe
guards: first, the suspect will be informed of his four Miranda rights
prior to police questioning;13 and, second, the suspect has at least a
theoretical opportunity either to avoid or to halt police questioning by
invoking his right to remain silent14 or his right to have an attorney
present.15
These safeguards are not insignificant. Although there has been
much dispute relating to Miranda's impact on the police's ability to
obtain confessions,16 it seems highly likely that, in response to the
warnings, a small group of suspects who would otherwise make state
ments to the police choose not to speak.17 In addition, the warnings
may lead some suspects to invoke their rights at some point during the
interrogation, thereby reducing the extent of their incriminating
statements. In the great majority of cases, however, suspects respond
to the Miranda warnings by waiving their rights.18 Once those rights
have been waived, the restraints Miranda imposes on police interroga
tors are minimal.
For constitutional purposes, however, the question is not whether
Miranda imposes significant restraints on police interrogators. Rather,
the question is whether Miranda's safeguards, combined with the
Court's other constitutional restrictions on interrogation practices,
provide suspects with sufficient protection against interrogation prac
tices that should be viewed as pernicious, in the sense that they are
abusive, overreaching, or otherwise contrary to societal norms. In ad(1999); Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SUP. Cf. REV.
99, 100.
13. Prior to custodial interrogation, the suspect must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that anything he says may be used against him as evidence, that he has a right
to have an attorney present during questioning, and that, if he cannot afford an attorney, one
will be appointed to represent him. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966).
1 4. In Miranda, the Court stated: "If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time
prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease."
Id. at473-74. This language was subsequently interpreted in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96
(1975). See infra text accompanying notes 27-28.
15. In Miranda, the Court stated: "If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the
interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." 384 U.S. at 474. This language was
subsequently interpreted in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), and its progeny. See
infra text accompanying notes 3 0-34.
16. Compare, e.g. , Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty
Year Perspective on Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 5 0 STAN. L. REV. 1 055
(1998), with Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and
Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500 (1996). See generally Leo & White,
supra note 12, at 399-400.
17. See Leo & White, supra note 12, at 468-70.
18. See Richard A. Leo, Miranda and the Problem of False Confessions, in THE
MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING 275 (Richard A. Leo & George c.
Thomas III eds., 1998).
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dressing this question, I will consider both the effectiveness of the
safeguards Miranda does provide and the significance of the post
Miranda Court's nearly total failure to identify pernicious interroga
tion practices.
Part I considers the extent to which Miranda's core protections informing suspects subject to interrogation of their constitutional
rights and providing them with an opportunity to halt the interroga
tion by invoking their rights - protect individuals from pernicious in
terrogation practices. Part II considers the significance of the post
Miranda Court's failure to identify and to restrain pernicious interro
gation practices. Parts III and IV then consider some of the ways in
which the post-Miranda due process test should be modified so as to
provide more effective restraints on such practices. Part III addresses
the problem of identifying pernicious interrogation practices. In ad
dressing this question, Part III responds to some of Professor Laurie
Magid's assertions relating to the basis for prohibiting or regulating
interrogation practices. In particular, it challenges her conclusion that
the existing empirical evidence fails to prove that police-induced false
confessions are a problem demanding societal attention. It then dis
cusses both the proper role of empirical evidence in identifying perni
cious interrogation practices and the reasons why interrogation prac
tices that are substantially likely to produce untrustworthy confessions
should be prohibited. Based on the principle that interrogation prac
tices substantially likely to produce untrustworthy confessions should
be excluded, Part IV then identifies three police practices that should
be prohibited or subjected to close scrutiny. Part V then summarizes
the Article's principal conclusions.
I.

THE LIMITED EFFECT OF MIRANDA'S CORE PROTECTIONS

In Davis v. United States, 19 the Court stated that "the primary pro
tection afforded suspects subject to custodial interrogation is the
Miranda warnings themselves."20 It added that "[f]ull comprehension
of the rights to remain silent and request an attorney [is] sufficient to
dispel whatever coercion is inherent in the interrogation process. "21
Based on this language, the current Court apparently believes that, in
most instances, interrogators' iteration of the Miranda warnings pro
vides a suspect with adequate protection from pernicious interrogation
practices. If the suspect believes she lacks the resources to deal with
the pressures generated by custodial interrogation, she can invoke one
of her rights, thereby avoiding interrogation. Moreover, if she decides
19. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
20. 512 U.S. at 460.
21. Id. (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986)).
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to waive her Miranda rights but thereafter concludes that her interro
gators are subjecting her to undue pressure, she has another opportu
nity to invoke one of her rights, thereby halting the interrogation.
In the context of twenty-first century interrogation practices, how
ever, the claim that a suspect's awareness of her rights provides an an
tidote to the coercive effect of custodial interrogation is either naive or
disingenuous. In Miranda itself, the Court said that "[t]he circum
stances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly
to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his
interrogators."22 As the length of a custodial interrogation increases,
the practical significance of the suspect's knowledge of his rights de
creases.
In addition, the practices employed by seasoned interrogators will
often have the effect of undermining a suspect's ability or inclination
to assert rights.23 Transcripts of modern interrogations indicate that
police interrogators are often so overwhelmingly in control of the in
terrogation - dictating the pace of the questioning and the topics un
der discussion - that the suspect has no practical opportunity to in
voke his rights during the most critical parts of the interrogation.24 In
addition, the interrogator's ability to connect with the suspect sometimes by establishing a close rapport so that the suspect views the
interrogator as a mentor or a father figure25 - often renders the sus
pect unable or disinclined to break the connection by asserting his
rights. In many cases, the Miranda warnings are therefore inadequate
to counteract the pressures generated by sophisticated interrogators.
If a suspect wants to halt an interrogation, moreover, post-Miranda
cases make it difficult for him to do so. If the suspect invokes his right

22. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966). In this quote, the Court was talking
about the suspect's right to remain silent. The same point applies, of course, even if the sus
pect is given the four Miranda warnings rather than merely informed of his right to remain
silent.
23. We know a good deal more about what transpires during an interrogation today
than we did at the time Miranda was decided, thanks in part to Kamisar's admonition that
we cannot understand issues relating to police questioning unless we have some under
standing of "what such questioning is really like." KAMISAR, ESSAYS, supra note 1 , at 1
(quoting Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, in POLICE
POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 155 (C. Sowle ed., 1962)).
24. For examples of questioning that is so rapid that the suspect has no practical oppor
tunity to halt the questioning in order to invoke his rights, see Richard J. Ofshe & Richard
A. Leo, The Social Psychology of Police Interrogation: The Theory and Classification of True
and False Confessions, 16 STUD. IN LAW, POL. & SOC'Y 189, 227-30 (1997) (hereinafter
Ofshe & Leo, Social Psychology] (interrogation of Dante Parker); id. at 231-33 (interroga
tion of Edgar Garrett).
25. During Peter Reilly's interrogation, for example, the seventeen-year-old suspect
came to view his chief interrogator as a father figure. At one point, he even asked if it might
be possible for him to come and live with the interrogator and his family. See JOAN
BARTHEL, A DEATH IN CANAAN 98 (1977).
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to remain silent, Michigan v. Mosley26 holds that the police are not re
quired to cease the interrogation permanently. Rather, after tempo
rarily halting the interrogation, they can resume questioning so long as
they "scrupulously honor" the suspect's invocation of his right.27 In
practice, therefore, a patient interrogator will often be able to proceed
with an interrogation even after a suspect invokes his right to remain
silent.28
If the suspect asserts his right to have an attorney present at ques
tioning, Edwards v. Arizona29 requires police to end the interrogation
immediately. Questioning cannot resume until the suspect initiates
further exchanges with the police.30 Davis v. United States,31 however,
held that, in order to satisfy Edwards, the suspect "must articulate his
desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable
police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to
be a request for an attorney."32 If the suspect's statements fail to meet
this test, the police need not even pause for the purpose of clarifying
the suspect's position.33 They can simply continue the interrogation,34
perhaps directing their questions to deter or deflect the suspect's re
quests for an attorney. Post-Miranda decisions therefore permit the
police to interrogate suspects in ways that prevent the suspect's effec
tive invocation of his rights.35

26. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
27. Id. , at 103-04 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Hsu, 852 F.2d 407, 410-12 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that po
lice "scrupulously honor[ed]" the suspect's right to remain silent even though the same offi
cer questioned him shortly after he asserted his right); Maestas v. State, 987 S.W.2d 59, 64
(Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (holding police "scrupulously honored" the suspect's right to remain
silent where the same officer sought and obtained the suspect's Miranda waiver nine hours
after the suspect had initially invoked her right to remain silent).
29. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
30. See id. at 484-85. In Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1043-46 (1983) (Rehnquist,
J., plurality opinion), a pivotal plurality of the Court interpreted "initiated" broadly, holding
that the police were permitted to resume interrogation when, after invoking his right to an
attorney, the suspect said to the police, "Well, what is going to happen to me now?"
31. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
32. Id. at 459.
33. If, for example, the suspect says, "Maybe I need an attorney," the interrogator could
either ignore this comment entirely or say something that might deflect the suspect's interest
in having an attorney. As suggested in the first edition of the lnbau Interrogation Manual, he
might say, for example, "Joe, I'm only looking for the truth, and if you're telling the truth,
that's it. You can handle this by yourself." FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 112 (1962).
34. See id.
35. Justice Souter's assessment of suspects subjected to custodial interrogation seems
apt: "A substantial percentage of them lack anything like a confident command of the
English language, many are 'woefully ignorant,' and many more will be sufficiently intimi
dated by the interrogation process or overwhelmed by the uncertainty of their predicament
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In practice, therefore, Miranda's core protections provide only
minimal safeguards. Police routinely obtain Miranda waivers, and po
lice routinely prevent suspects from asserting their Miranda rights
during post-waiver interrogations. As the Court stated in Davis, "the
primary," if not the only, protection afforded suspects subjected to in
terrogation is the information contained in the "Miranda warnings
themselves. "36 In the context of twenty-first century interrogation
practices, however, information relating to one's constitutional rights
provides only minimal protection against pernicious interrogation
practices.
II.

MIRANDA'S FAILURE TO PROHIBIT PERNICIOUS
INTERROGATION PRACTICES

As interpreted by the post-Miranda Court, one of Miranda's most
striking limitations is its failure to impose significant restraints on po
lice interrogation practices. Miranda provides virtually no restrictions
on interrogation practices designed to induce Miranda waivers and on
interrogation practices employed after waivers are obtained.
Miranda, of course, could have been interpreted to impose such re
strictions.37 Miranda itself stated that "the fact of lengthy interroga
tion . . . before a statement is made is strong evidence that the accused
did not validly waive his rights."38 This language could have been in
terpreted to mean that lengthy interrogations are generally impermis
sible. The Miranda decision's apparent disapproval of interrogation
techniques described in various interrogation manuals,39 moreover,
could have been interpreted to prohibit interrogators from employing
those practices. And Miranda's language imposing a heavy burden of
waiver on the government40 could have been interpreted to preclude
interrogators from employing interrogation practices that pressure
suspects to give up their right to remain silent through pressing them
to reveal information they are reluctant to disclose.
But post-Miranda cases have not interpreted Miranda in these
ways. Neither the Supreme Court nor any lower court has ever indi-

that the ability to speak assertively will abandon them." Davis, 512 U.S. at 469-70 (Souter, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted).
36. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460 (1994).
37. See generally Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 581 , 588-90, 608-17 (1979) (arguing that the Miranda's safeguards should be inter
preted to prohibit other deceptive interrogation techniques).
38. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966).
39. See id. at 449-54.
40. See id. at 475-76.
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cated that the length of the interrogation,41 the interrogation tactics
employed during the interrogation, or pressure exerted on the suspect
to reveal information he is reluctant to disclose has any bearing on the
validity of the suspect's Miranda waiver. On the contrary, once the
suspect validly waives his Miranda rights, the due process voluntari
ness test provides the only restrictions on police interrogation prac
tices.
The restrictions provided by that test are insubstantial. Over the
past two decades, the Rehnquist Court has indicated that the post
Miranda due process test is essentially identical to the pre-Miranda
test.42 As under the old test, confessions induced by force,43 threats of
force,44 promises of protection from force,45 or by excessively lengthy
continuous interrogations46 are involuntary. When these extreme
techniques are absent, however, the voluntariness of a confession is
determined on the basis of a totality of circumstances test, under
which a court must assess both the interrogators' practices and the
suspect's individual characteristics for the purpose of determining
whether the suspect's will was overborne.47
Even when it was most rigorously applied, this test imposed few
limitations on interrogators. Except for the clear prohibition of ex
treme tactics, such as the use of force or the threat of force, the Court
provided few, if any, guidelines as to what practices were prohibited.
Indeed, an interrogation practice impermissible in one case might be
entirely permissible in another case involving different circum
stances.48 Interrogators operating in this environment of legal uncer41. For lower courts holding a defendant's Miranda waiver valid despite the fact that the
defendant was subjected to a lengthy interrogation see, for example, State v. Schofield, No.
23038-1-11, 1999 Wash. App. LEXIS 1924 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 1999) (Miranda waiver
valid despite twelve-hour interrogation); State v. LaPointe, 678 A.2d 942 (Conn. 1996)
(Miranda waiver valid despite nine-hour interrogation).
42. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 286-88 (1991); Colorado v. Connelly, 479
U.S. 157, 176 (1986). See generally Welsh S. White, What is an Involuntary Confession Now?,
50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2001, 2008-20 (1998) [hereinafter White, Involuntary Confession].
43. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
44. See, e.g. , Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967).
45. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279; Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
46. See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944) (holding that thirty-six hours of
virtually continuous interrogation is "inherently coercive").
47. See cases cited supra note 45; see also Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54-55
(1962); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321-23 (1959).
48. In Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959), for example, the Court expressed disap
proval for the deceptive strategy employed by the interrogators, thus suggesting that certain
categories of police trickery might constitute improper interrogation practices. In Spano it
self, however, the Court stated that the trickery employed was simply "another factor which
deserves mention in the totality of the situation." 360 U.S. at 323. If the same trickery were
employed on another suspect under different circumstances, a lower court could thus prop
erly hold that employing the trickery in those circumstances would not render the suspect's
confession involuntary.
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tainty were naturally inclined to err on the side of law enforcement in
terests, employing any interrogation techniques not expressly prohib
ited. Lower courts similarly lacked guidelines for applying the volun
tariness test and struggled to determine whether particular
interrogation techniques were impermissible.
Indeed, the limitations of the pre-Miranda voluntariness test
prompted the Court to seek "some automatic device by which the po
tential evils of incommunicado interrogation [could] be controlled."49
Simultaneously, those concerned with restraining pernicious interroga
tion practices sought a constitutional rule that would impose effective,
general restraints on the police.50 Miranda represented the solution to
these problems. To the extent that the Court intended Miranda to re
place the due process voluntariness test, however, the Miranda Court
did not contemplate the important role that the due process voluntari
ness test would continue to play in regulating post-waiver interroga
. tion practices.
Ironically, Miranda's practical limitations may have derived from
the fact that Miranda effectively reduced the efficacy of the due proc
ess voluntariness test. Although the pre-Miranda due process test con
stantly shifted and evolved,51 the Warren Court applied the test with
increasing strictness in the decade before Miranda was decided.
Miranda halted this trend. In the post-Miranda era, the Court has
equated a confession involuntary under the due process test with one
that is compelled under the Fifth Amendment privilege.52 In
Dickerson, the Court acknowledged that, when the police have "ad
hered to the dictates of Miranda," a defendant will rarely be able to
make even "a colorable argument that [his] self-incriminating state
ment was 'compelled.' "53 Lower court decisions corroborate the view
expressed in Dickerson. A survey of recent decisions suggests that,
when the police have complied with Miranda, it is very difficult for a
defendant to establish that a confession obtained after a Miranda
waiver violated due process.54
49. Stone, supra note 12, at 103 (quoting WALTER SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND
SOCIETY 10 (1967)).
50. See, e.g., KAMISAR, ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 25 (advocating that the Court "scrap"
the voluntariness test and adopt "a more direct approach").
SL See generally Catherine Hancock, Due Process Before Miranda, 70 TUL. L. REV.
2195 (1996) (tracing the Court's shifting and evolving application of the due process volun
tariness test).

52. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 n.5 (1984).
53. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (2000) (quoting Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984)).
54. Based on a Westlaw search examining all federal and state cases decided during the
years 1999 and 2000, it appears that, out of all the cases in those years in which the police
obtained valid Miranda waivers, there were only four cases in 1999 and five in 2000 in which
courts held the suspect's post-waiver confession involuntary. See Search of WESTLAW,
Allfeds and Allstates Library (Oct. 15, 2000) (on file with the author). In at least four of
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Two factors have contributed to the infrequency with which lower
courts find due process violations in post-waiver confession cases.
First, lower courts conflate the test for determining a valid Miranda
waiver with the test for determining a voluntary confession because
the tests are so similar. Both tests require the court to assess the "to
tality of circumstances" to determine whether the suspect's action was
voluntary.ss Although lower courts generally apply the two tests sepa
rately,s6 some courts appear to equate a finding that a suspect's
Miranda waiver was voluntary with a conclusion that her confession
was also voluntary. A finding that the police have properly informed
the suspect of his Miranda rights thus often has the effect of minimiz
ing or eliminating the scrutiny applied to post-waiver interrogation
practices.
Second, the Supreme Court's limited application of the voluntari
ness test during the post-Miranda era has probably increased lower
courts' natural inclination to disfavor involuntary confession claims.
During the thirty-year period prior to Miranda, the Supreme Court
held confessions involuntary in at least twenty-three cases.s7 In the
thirty-four years since Miranda, however, it has held confessions in
voluntary in only two cases: Mincey v. Arizonass (1978) and A rizona v.
Fulminantes9 (1991). As Professor Louis Michael Seidman has indi
cated, this "silence at the top" has undoubtedly led some lower courts
to believe that claims of involuntary confessions need not be treated
seriously. 60
Miranda's most significant limitation is thus its failure to identify
and to prohibit (or even to promote the identification and prohibition
these cases (two in 1999 and two in 2000), moreover, this holding was based on state consti
tutional law rather than the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
55. See, e.g., State v. Murray, 510 N.W.2d 107, 110 (N.D. 1994) (applying due process
voluntariness test to determine the validity of a Miranda waiver). See generally Leo & White,
supra note 12, at 418.
56. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 929 F.2d 96, 98 (2d Cir. 1991) (observing that,
even if suspect's Miranda waiver is valid, the court must still decide whether the officer "co
erced [him] into confessing").
57. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503
(1963); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963);
Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961);
Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961 ); Blackburn v.
Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Payne v. Arkansas,
356 U.S. 560 (1958); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556
(1954); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949);
Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948); Lee v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 742 (1948); Haley
v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Ward v. Texas, 316
U.S. 547 (1942); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227
(1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
58. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
59. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
60. See Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 745 (1992).

March 2001]

Restraining Pernicious Interrogation Practices

1221

of) pernicious interrogation practices. Is it appropriate to leave this
problem to other institutions, such as legislatures or state courts?61
Based on the Court's interpretation of both the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and the Fourteenth Amendment
due process clause, "interrogation techniques . . . offensive to a civi
lized system of justice"62 are unconstitutional. The Court thus has a
constitutional obligation to address this issue. In order to fill the gap
left by Miranda and the post-Miranda due process test, the Court
should formulate rules restricting pernicious interrogation practices.
III.

IDENTIFYING PERNICIOUS INTERROGATION PRACTICES

What criteria should the Court use to identify pernicious interroga
tion practices?
Professor Laurie Magid argues that the primary, if not the sole, cri
terion for determining whether an interrogation practice is permissible
is whether the interrogation practice will produce unreliable confes
sions.63 Magid apparently agrees that interrogation practices that cre
ate an "unreasonable risk that an innocent person would falsely con
fess"64 should be prohibited.
According to Magid, however, the existing empirical evidence fails
to establish that police-induced false confessions occur with sufficient
frequency to invalidate any current interrogation practices or to justify
additional restraints on police interrogation practices. Specifically, she
asserts that the few dozen police-induced false confession cases re
ported by commentators such as Richard A. Leo and Richard J.
Ofshe65 are insufficient to establish that police-induced false confes
sions present a societal problem of sufficient magnitude to demand at-

61. Based on prior experience, there is little reason to believe that either state legisla
tures or Congress would be likely to address this problem in a way that would provide addi
tional protection for suspects subjected to interrogation. The 1968 Congress's response to
Miranda's invitation for Congress to provide alternative safeguards for protecting custodial
suspects' right to exercise their right to remain silent provides an example of the typical leg
islative response. Instead of providing alternative means of protecting suspects' rights,
Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 3501, which was intended to overrule Miranda. See generally
Kamisar, supra note 4 (explaining the purpose and legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 3501).
62. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163 (1986) (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S.
104, 109 (1985)).
63. Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices: How Far is Too Far?, 99
MICH. L. REV. 1 168, 1 1 87 (2001) ("Because the reliability rationale focuses on protecting
innocent suspects, it offers a more palatable - and appropriate - reason for limiting inter
rogation.").
64. Id. at 438.
65. See Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions:
Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages ofJustice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation,
88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998) (collecting 60 proven and probable police
induced false confessions) [hereinafter Leo & Ofshe, Consequences].
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tention.66 In order to justify additional restraints on interrogation tac
tics, Magid would require refinements in the research on false confes
sions. According to her, future research "will need to be based on a
statistically significant, randomly drawn sample of persons who gave
confessions during interrogation."67 If such research indicated that few
innocent suspects falsely confessed, additional restrictions on decep
tive interrogation practices would be unjustified.68
Both Magid's standard for determining a pernicious interrogation
practice and her assessments of the empirical evidence are wrong. In
view of Miranda's holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege applies
to custodial interrogation,69 Magid's claim that the prevention of unre
liable confessions is the sole (or primary) basis for prohibiting interro
gation practices cannot be correct. Even if this claim were correct, it
would not follow that the frequency with which interrogation practices
induce false confessions in typical cases is the criterion for determining
whether a problem exists. In my judgment, the empirical evidence suf
ficiently establishes both that police-induced false confessions occur
frequently enough to create a serious societal problem and that cur
rent interrogation practices tend to produce these false confessions.
In supporting my claims, I will try to explain both the role and the
limitations of empirical evidence in examining police interrogations. In
Section A, I will show that reliability cannot be the sole criterion for
determining whether an interrogation practice is pernicious. In Section
B, I will assess the role of empirical evidence in determining both the
frequency of police-induced false confessions and whether that fre
quency is socially significant. In Section C, I will consider how empiri
cal evidence may be used to assist in identifying interrogation prac
tices likely to produce untrustworthy confessions. Finally, in Section
D, I will explain why the conclusion that an interrogation practice is
substantially likely to produce an untrustworthy confession should be
the criterion for determining that an interrogation practice is perni
cious and warrants prohibition - even without empirical data to
prove that the practice has actually produced false confessions.

66. Magid, supra note 63, at 1193.
67. Id. at 1190.
68. Id.

69. As Professor Steven J. Schulhofer has observed, Miranda was in fact predicated on
"three" holdings. See Steven J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435,
436 (1987). The first was that the Fifth Amendment privilege applies to the "informal com
pulsion exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-custody questioning." Miranda, 384
U.S. at 461.
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Contemporary Standards of Fairness Should Determine the
Permissibility of Interrogation Tactics

Skilled interrogators could employ even the most pernicious inter
rogation tactics in ways that would only produce reliable confessions.
Indeed, as early continental systems of criminal procedure recognized,
practices involving torture would produce reliable statements if the
practices were "employed in such a way" that a guilty suspect would
be required to reveal merely details corroborating his guilt. Through
the use of non-suggestive questioning, the interrogator could establish
the suspect's guilt by forcing him to reveal "information which . . . 'no
innocent person [could] know.' "70 As Ofshe and Leo have explained,71
modem interrogators can apply a variation of this technique to assess
the reliability of suspects' confessions. By analyzing " [t]he fit between
the suspect's post-admission narrative and the facts of the crime" the
interrogator should be able to determine "whether the suspect pos
sesses actual knowledge of the crime" and thus whether the suspect is
making a true confession.72 In many cases, therefore, interrogators can
ensure that the tactics they employ will only be used to produce reli
able confessions.
If, as Magid suggests,73 the sole basis for imposing constitutional
restrictions on interrogation practices is to exclude unreliable confes
sions, there is no need to prohibit any interrogation practices. Scruti
nizing the reliability of each suspect's confession would be sufficient to
protect this constitutional interest. If the government could show cor
roboration or other circumstances verifying the reliability of a par
ticular confession, there would be no constitutional basis for exclu
sion. 74
As I have already indicated, however, ensuring the reliability of
confessions is not the sole basis for monitoring police interrogation
practices. In Miranda, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment ap
plies to custodial interrogation.75 In addition, the pre-Miranda due
process test barred the government's use of an involuntary confes
sion. 76 During the post-Miranda era, the Court has conflated these
70. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF 5 (1977).
71. See Ofshe & Leo, Social Psychology, supra note 24, at 198-99.
72. Id. at 198 (emphasis omitted).
73. Magid, supra note 63, at 1171.
74. At least one commentator has essentially adopted this position. Professor Joseph D.
Grano has asserted that in confession cases the "due process inquiry should focus on the
likelihood of unreliability in a particular case." Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will
and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859, 921 (1979).
75. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
76. See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). See generally Hancock, supra note
51.
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protections, holding that confessions involuntary under the due proc
ess test are also compelled within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment privilege.77
In determining whether a confession is involuntary, however, the
Court has always examined the interrogation methods employed by
the police as well as their actual effect on the defendant. Thus, in
Colorado v. Connelly,78 the Court reiterated that "certain interroga
tion techniques, either in isolation or as applied to the unique charac
teristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of
justice that they must be condemned."79 In assessing the legitimacy of
interrogation practices, the focus is thus on the nature of the interro
gation practice itself, not on whether the practice appeared to have
produced an unreliable confession. Interrogation practices viewed as
pernicious based on contemporary standards of fairness should be
prohibited.
B.

The Role of Empirical Evidence in Determining Whether Police
Induced False Confessions A re a Significant Problem

No one disputes that police-induced false confessions have resulted
in wrongful convictions during the post-Miranda era. Disagreement
arises, however, over whether the rate of wrongful convictions is a sig
nificant social problem and, if so, whether police-induced false confes
sions lead to a significant percentage of all wrongful convictions.
Echoing assertions of Paul Cassell,80 Magid h as suggested that the
failure to find police-induced false confessions in a random sample of
police interrogation cases constitutes strong evidence that police
induced false confessions are not a serious societal problem .81 But this
suggestion fails to take account of the context in which police-induced
false confessions are likely to be found. The existing evidence of
police-induced false confessions, such as the cases collected by Leo
and Ofshe,82 seems to establish that such confessions are most likely to

77. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 n.5 (1984) (observing that, in order
to show his confession was compelled within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment privilege,
the defendant would have to show that "his statement was coerced under traditional due
process standards").
78. 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
79. 479 U.S. at 163 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985)).
80. See Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost Confes
sions - and from Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497, 507 (1998).
·

81. Magid, supra note 63, at 1 1 90.
82. See Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 65, at 444-49; see also Welsh S. White,
False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 133 (1997) (observing that police-induced "false confessions
are most likely to occur in a small but significant category of cases - high-profile cases in
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occur in high profile cases. In high profile cases, the police are under
significant pressure to solve a crime and, because of the magnitude of
the investigation, are able to devote an unusually large amount of time
to interrogating suspects.83 In contrast, interrogations conducted in low
profile cases - the type of case likely to be collected in a random
sample of interrogations84 - would be much less likely to produce a
false confession. In low profile cases, interrogators are generally disin
clined to expend the time or employ the range of tactics likely to pro
duce an untrustworthy confession. Barring unusual circumstances,
moreover, suspects in such cases are likely to be guilty,85 thus further
reducing the risk of a false confession.86 A random sample of interro
gation cases is, therefore, unlikely to resolve the critical questions re
lating to the magnitude of the problem of police-induced false confes
sions.
Examining a sample of wrongful convictions in high profile or po
tentially capital cases, in contrast, could illuminate the extent to which
police-induced false convictions precipitate wrongful convictions. If
one accepts the premise that society should be concerned about
wrongful convictions in high profile or potentially capital cases, then a
finding that police-induced false confessions precipitate a significant
proportion of wrongful convictions in such cases should be sufficient
to show that police-induced false confessions are a significant prob
lem.
Although Magid, Cassell, and others may disagree with me, the
apparent number of miscarriages of justice in potentially capital cases
seems to me to be sufficiently large to provoke concern.87 Evidence
which the police have no suspects other than the one who is subjected to interrogation")
(hereinafter White, False Confessions].
83. See Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are Common
in Capital Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 469, 485 (1996).
84. See, e.g. , Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 266 (1996).
85. The leading interrogation manual advises police that they should only use the psy
chologically-oriented interrogation techniques designed to elicit a confession when they are
reasonably certain that the suspect is guilty. See Fred E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 332 (3d ed. 1986). In the typical case, an officer's belief
that a suspect is guilty is likely to be correct.
86. If the suspect is guilty, even the most pernicious interrogation tactics will not be
likely to produce a false confession because, even if the suspect feels compelled to admit
facts dictated by his interrogators, the essence of the admitted facts - the suspect's commis
sion of the crime charged-. will likely be true.
87. See, e.g. , Caitlin Lovinger, Death Row's Living Alumni, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1999, §
4, at 1 (observing that "[s]ince the United States Supreme Court reinstated capital punish
ment in 1 976, 566 people have been executed [and] . . 82 convicts awaiting execution have
been exonerated - a ratio of 1 freed for every 7 put to death"). See generally Donald A.
Dripps, Miscarriages of Justice and the Constitution, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 635, 638-39
(1999) (summarizing data relating to wrongful convidions in capital cases); Daniel Givelber,
Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do· We Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49
.
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indicating that police-induced false confessions account for a signifi
cant proportion of such miscarriages of justice would thus indicate that
police-induced false confessions have contributed to a significant so
cietal problem.
A randomly selected sample of cases involving probable wrongful
convictions in potentially capital cases provides a reasonable source
for determining the extent to which various causes are likely to pre
cipitate such convictions. If it appears that police-induced false confes
sions contributed to a significant proportion of the convictions con
tained in such a sample, reducing such confessions should properly be
identified as a priority of our criminal justice system.
Several collections of proven, or probable, wrongful convictions
exist.88 In order to determine the extent to which false confessions pre
cipitate wrongful convictions, however, the collection should meet
several criteria. First, it should be limited to serious cases. Second, it
should be large enough so that it is likely to contain a representative
selection of wrongful convictions in such cases. Third, the collection
should be selected so that the most important causes of such wrongful
convictions are unlikely to be either under- or over-represented.
Fourth, and finally, the causes of the probably wrongful convictions
should be identified with sufficient clarity so that it can be determined
whether a police-induced false confession played any significant part
in precipitating the wrongful conviction. Among the recent collections
of wrongful conviction cases, the Bedau-Radelet collection of prob
able miscarriages of justices in capital cases89 comes closest to satisfy
ing these four criteria.
Bedau and Radelet identified 350 potentially capital cases in which
miscarriages of justice90 occurred in America between the years 1900
and 1985.91 In selecting their cases, the authors relied heavily on previ
ous research. Consequently, better known and previously researched
cases were most likely to be included.92 Because their cases are better
RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1346-58 (1997) (summarizing and interpreting studies of false con
victions in serious criminal cases).
88. See EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932); EDWARD
CONNORS ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY
SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE
AFTER TRIAL (1996); JEROME FRANK & BARBARA FRANK, NOT GUILTY (1957); Hugo
Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40
STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987).
89. See Bedau & Radelet, supra note 88.
90. Bedau and Radelet defined miscarriages of justice in potentially capital cases as
"cases in which: (a) The defendant was convicted o( homicide or sentenced to death for
rape; and (b) when either (i) no such crime actually occurred, or (ii) the defendant was le
gally and physically uninvolved in the crime." Id. at 45 (emphasis omitted).
91. See id. at 38.
92. See id. at 28.
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known and have been subjected to more intense scrutiny than average
miscarriage of justice cases, their pool does not represent a random
sample of miscarriages of justices in potentially capital cases. In addi
tion Paul Cassell and Stephen J. Markman have challenged the Bedau
Radelet conclusions in 10 of the 350 cases, asserting that the defen
dants included in those ten cases were in fact guilty.93
Nevertheless, the Bedau-Radelet pool would appear to provide a
representative data set for the causes of miscarriages of justice in po
tentially capital cases. There is no reason to believe that better known
miscarriages of j ustice in potentially capital cases resulted from signifi
cantly different causes than other miscarriages of justice in similar
cases. The fact that a small percentage of these cases may be inaccu
rately classified, moreover, would h ave only a slight bearing on the ex
tent to which their sample represents the relevant population. There is
no reason to believe that the possible misclassifications are likely to
include a disproportionate number of cases involving any particular
precipitating causes of wrongful convictions. Consequently, any mis
classifications would simply have the effect of decreasing the size of
the relevant sample,94 without reducing the validity of generalizations
relating to the likelihood of particular causes precipitating wrongful
convictions in potentially capital cases.
In fourteen of 350 cases, Bedau and Radelet concluded that the re
cord was too slender to provide any basis for determining the cause of
the wrongful conviction.95 In the other 336 cases, they concluded that a
police-induced false confession was a cause of the wrongful conviction
in 49, or 14.3 % , of the cases.96 Of the causes that Bedau and Radelet
directly linked to the police or prosecution, false confessions ranked
third. Only perjury by prosecution witnesses (117, or 34.8 % ) and mis
taken eyewitness identifications (56, or 1 6.7% )97 accounted for more
wrongful convictions. Even if the Bedau-Radelet sample is limited to
probably wrongful convictions occurring after Miranda, the percent
age of wrongful convictions attributable to false confessions declines
by only 3.5 percentage points; 1 1.4% of the wrongful convictions dur
ing the post-Miranda era were found to result from false confessions.98
This figure ( 1 1 .4 % ) may be compared with the 37.5% of wrongful

93. See Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response to
the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121 (1988). For a response to the claims of
Cassell and Markman, see Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, The Myth of
Infallibility: A Reply to Markman and Cassell, 41 STAN. L. REV. 161 (1988).
94. See Gross, supra note 83, at 470-71.
95. See Bedau & Radelet, supra note 88, at 64.

96. See id. at 173-79.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 177-79.
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convictions resulting from perjured testimony and 24.1 % of wrongful
convictions resulting from mistaken eyewitness testimony.99
Since mistaken eyewitness identifications are generally understood
to be the most frequent cause of wrongful convictions,100 the Bedau
Radelet study surprised commentators in finding that the percentage
of wrongful convictions resulting from police-induced false confessions
was comparable to the percentage resulting from mistaken identifica
tion witnesses. 1 0 1 As Professor Samuel Gross explained in a thoughtful
article,1 02 the Bedau-Radelet results suggest that conventional wisdom
regarding the causes of wrongful convictions does not necessarily ap
ply in capital or other high profile cases. In typical felony cases, mis
taken identification evidence is much more likely to precipitate wrong
ful convictions than police-induced false confessions. In high profile
cases, however, where the police have more time to investigate and
are under greater pressure to make an arrest, the possibility of a po
lice-induced false confession is much greater than it is in ordinary
cases. In that context, the chances of error resulting from police
induced false confessions are comparable to the chances of error re
sulting from mistaken identifications, the cause that in most contexts
has been recognized as the most significant precipitator of wrongful
convictions.
The Bedau-Radelet data does not, of course, establish even a
rough estimate of the extent to which police�induced false confessions
contribute to wrongful convictions in potentially capital cases. In de
termining whether a phenomenon is of sufficient magnitude to war
rant societal concern, however, estimating the exact size of the phe
nomenon is not critical. Wrongful convictions in potentially capital
cases may be analogized to a particularly virulent disease. If data
showing that about 10 % of the people suffering from a serious disease
had been injected with a drug that appeared to contribute to the out
break of the disease, for example, this would be enough to provoke
concern. The existing data suggests that police-induced false confes
sions have contributed to producing the "disease" of wrongful convic
tions in about one-tenth of all cases. Although this data is certainly not
conclusive, it is sufficient to show that wrongful convictions resulting

99. See id.
100. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229 (1967) (quoting Wall's assertion that
"[t]he influence of improper suggestion upon identifying witnesses probably accounts for
more miscarriages of justice than any other single factor - perhaps it is responsible for more
such errors than all other factors combined"). See generally PATRICK M. WALL, EYE
WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 26 (1965).
101. See, e.g. , Gross, supra note 83, at 485 (observing that the Bedau-Radelet data indi
cates that "false confessions are a much more common cause of errors for homicides than for
other crimes").
102. See Gross, supra note 83.
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from police-induced false confessions are of sufficient magnitude to
mandate concern.
C.

The Role of Empirical Evidence in Identifying Interrogation
Practices Likely to Produce Untrustworthy Confessions

The common law voluntariness test sought to exclude untrust
worthy confessions.103 In applying that test, courts relied on intuition
rather than empirical data to identify interrogation practices likely to
produce such confessions. Eighteenth-century English courts assumed,
for example, that confessions induced by threats or promises were in
herently unreliable.104 Based on this assumption, confessions induced
by threats or promises were excluded.105
Over the past two decades, scholars have conducted considerable
empirical research on police-induced false confessions. As Magid
points out,106 commentators not only have collected cases of proven or
probable police-induced false confessions, but also they have carefully
examined these confessions to determine why they occurred.107 In
identifying modern interrogation practices likely to produce untrust
worthy confessions, it thus seems appropriate to rely on conclusions
emanating from this empirical data.
In using data to identify interrogation practices likely to produce
untrustworthy confessions, however, the focus should be on why false
confessions occur and " [h]ow . . . such errors [can] be prevented"108
rather than on how often false confessions occur or how often par
ticular tactics have been shown to produce false confessions. When a
particular interrogation tactic played a major part in producing a false
confession on even a few occasions, such a tactic should be classified
as constitutionally suspect.
It remains disputed whether the documented cases of proven or
probable police-induced false confessions are aberrations or the "tip
of the iceberg"109 - representing evidence of many undetected police103. See generally 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §
822 (Chadbourn ed. 1 970) [hereinafter WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE].
104. See The King v. Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 234-35 (K.B. 1783).
105. See id.
106. Magid, supra note 63, at 1 1 90.
107. See, e.g., GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS,
CONFESSIONS AND TESTIMONY 235-40, 260-73, 316-20 (1992) (analyzing several British
cases and one American case in which defendants were charged or convicted on the basis of
confessions later shown to be false); Ofshe & Leo, Social Psychology, supra note 24, at 194207 (explaining the psychological processes through which interrogators elicit both true and
false confessions).
108. Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 65, at 492 (emphasis omitted).
109. Magid, supra note 63, at 1206.
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induced false confessions.110 But even if there are relatively few police
induced false confession cases in the total universe of cases, a tactic
that is shown to have actually produced false confessions in a few
cases is capable of producing untrustworthy confessions in all cases.
Barring very unusual circumstances, no interrogation tactic can
produce a false confession unless the suspect is innocent.111 Thus, the
fact that an interrogation tactic appears to produce many more true
confessions than false ones does not indicate whether the tactic is
likely to produce trustworthy or untrustworthy confessions. The dis
parity between true and false confessions may be attributable to the
disproportionate number of the suspects who are guilty rather than
the particular tactic's tendency to produce true confessions.
Even a single case in which an interrogation tactic appeared to
play a major part in producing a false confession is significant. Barring
some evidence that the tactic had a highly aberrational effect on the
suspect - perhaps relating to the suspect's unusual psychological
characteristics - the fact that the tactic caused an innocent person to
confess provides strong evidence that the tactic will at least sometimes
lead a typical suspect to agree with the interrogator's version of the
relevant facts, regardless of her own initial belief in the truth of those
facts. The tactic will thus have a tendency to produce false confessions
from innocent suspects and true confessions from guilty suspects. If, as
appears likely, the tactic's tendency to produce both types of confes
sions is substantial, it is proper to conclude that the tactic is substan
tially likely to produce untrustworthy statements.
D.

Why Tactics Substantially L ikely to Produce Untrustworthy
Confessions Should Be Prohibited

Most responsible members of society would agree with Magid that
one standard against which police interrogation techniques should be
measured is its propensity to produce untrustworthy statements. If
there is a substantial likelihood that the employment of a particular
interrogation technique will produce untrustworthy statements, then
that interrogation technique should at least be viewed as highly prob
lematic. Support for this principle stems not only from our historical
concern for guarding against wrongful convictions resulting from
government-induced confessions, but also from a strong perception
that both guilty and innocent individuals should be protected against
the suffering - in terms of both psychological damage and impair
ment of autonomy - that results from overreaching or abusive inter
rogation practices.
1 10. Id.
1 1 1 . See id. at ll90.
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The due process voluntariness test derives from the common law
rule that excluded involuntary confessions on the ground that they
were untrustworthy.112 Since empirical data shows that modern jurors
are likely to give great weight to suspects' confessions, whether or not
they are reliable,113 the concern for preventing wrongful convictions
based on false confessions is just as great today as it was when the
common law rule evolved.114 .
But preventing the production of false confessions is not the sole,
or perhaps even the primary, reason for prohibiting interrogation
practices that are likely to produce untrustworthy statements. In many
cases, the pressure generated by an interrogation technique and the
likelihood that the technique will produce untrustworthy statements
will be substantially equivalent. As Professor George Thomas has
pointed out, in most instances a suspect would not falsely "admit guilt
unless she found the pressure to confess overwhelming."115 Accord
ingly, an interrogation method likely to produce untrustworthy state
ments should be constitutionally suspect regardless of whether its use
in a particular case actually resulted in an unreliable confession. The
interrogation method is suspect because of the damage it causes to in
dividual autonomy, as well as because of its potential for producing
false confessions.

1 12. See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., plural
ity opinion) (stating that under the Due Process clause " [t]he ultimate test remains that
which has been the only clearly established test in Anglo-American courts for two hundred
years: the test of voluntariness"). See generally White, False Confessions, supra note 82, at
111-13 (tracing the evolution of the due process voluntariness test).
1 13. See, e.g., Gerald R. Miller & F. Joseph Boster, Three Images of the Trial: Their
Implications for Psychological Research, in PSYCHOLOGY IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 19-38
(Bruce Dennis Sales ed., 1977) (discussing empirical data showing that in a mock trial ex
periment subjects exposed to various evidence of a suspect's guilt - including identification
evidence, circumstantial evidence, and the suspect's confession - were "significantly more
likely" to view the suspect's confession as establishing the suspect's guilt than either of the
other types of evidence). See generally McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 148, at 316 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972) ("[T]he introduction of a con
fession makes the other aspects of a trial in court superfluous, and the real trial, for all prac
tical purposes, occurs when the confession is obtained.").
114. The common Jaw rule excluded "involuntary confessions" on the ground that con
fessions resulting from certain pressures were untrustworthy. See, e.g. , The King v.
Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 234-35 (K.B. 1783) (explaining that "a confession forced
from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear" must be excluded because it
"comes in so questionable a shape when it is to be considered as the evidence of guilt, that
no credit ought to be given to it"). See generally White, False Confessions, supra note 82, at
1 11-12 (citing other early authorities).
115. George C. Thomas III, Justice O'Connor's Pragmatic View of Coerced Self
Incrimination, 13 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 117, 124 (1991).
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REVIVING THE DUE PROCESS VOLUNTARINESS TEST TO

REGULATE INTERROGATION PRACTICES LIKELY TO PRODUCE
UNTRUSTWORTHY CONFESSIONS

If interrogation practices substantially likely to produce untrust
worthy confessions should be prohibited, what new constitutional re
strictions on interrogation practices are appropriate? In addressing
this question, it is of course difficult to separate interrogation practices
from the suspects on which they are employed or the settings in which
the interrogations take place. In certain contexts, almost any interro
gation practices are substantially likely to produce untrustworthy con
fessions.
Thus, for more than three decades, it has been recognized that
modern interrogation methods are very likely to produce untrust
worthy confessions from mentally handicapped suspects. 1 1 6 Recent
empirical data suggests that youthful suspects are also especially likely
to make false statements in response to police interrogation. 1 17 Even
commentators who are sympathetic toward the interests of law en
forcement have recognized the need to provide safeguards against the
risk that standard interrogation methods will precipitate untrust
worthy confessions from these populations.1 18 Interrogation techniques
permissible in other contexts should, therefore, be prohibited when
interrogators are questioning youthful or mentally handicapped sus
pects.
Similarly, considerable evidence suggests that, regardless of the in
terrogation techniques employed, interrogations extending beyond a
certain length are likely to produce untrustworthy confessions. 1 1 9 In
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 1 20 which held that a confession following thirty
six hours of virtually continuous interrogation was involuntary, the
1 16. See President's Panel on Mental Retardation, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
LAW 33 (1963).
117. See, e.g., Margaret Talbot, The Maximum Security Adolescent, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
1 0, 2000, § 6 (Magazine), at 60 (observing that the seven- and eight-year-old boys who falsely
confessed to sexually assaulting and killing eleven-year-old Ryan Harris "were enticed to
confess over a McDonald's Happy Meal"). See generally Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra
note 65, at 458.
1 18. See, e.g. , Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and the "Innocent": An Examination of Al
leged Cases of Wrongful Convictions from False Confessions, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
523, 586 (1 999) (observing that special safeguards are needed to protect "mentally retarded"
suspects when they are interrogated by the police); Fred E. lnbau, Miranda's Immunization
of Low Intelligence Offenders, 24 PROSECUTOR: J. NAT'L DISTRICT ATT'YS, Spring 1991, at
9-10 (observing that youthful and mentally handicapped suspects are especially vulnerable to
police suggestion).
119. See generally White, Involuntary Confession, supra note 42, at 2046-49 (discussing
empirical data showing that lengthy interrogations are likely to produce false or untrust
worthy confessions).
120. 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
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Supreme Court provided some protection against lengthy interroga
tions. Based on recent empirical data relating to false confessions,
however, it appears that interrogations' permissible duration should
be shortened considerably. Regardless of the interrogation practices
employed, an interrogation should not be allowed to extend beyond
some prescribed limit, say six hours.121
In this Part, I will seek to identify interrogation practices that
should be viewed as pernicious because of their tendency to produce
untrustworthy statements when employed on normal suspects during
an interrogation of reasonable length. The fact that interrogators do
not generally rely on single tactics in isolation, but rather combine tac
tics to enhance the overall effectiveness of an interrogation, has two
implications for this analysis. First, in assessing the likelihood that a
particular interrogation tactic will produce an untrustworthy confes
sion, due regard must be given to the fact that the effect of the par
ticular tactic will generally be magnified by the context and manner in
which it is used. Second, the fact that interrogators generally employ
several interrogation tactics in combination makes it more difficult to
identify particular tactics that are substantially likely to produce un
trustworthy confessions. Based on the existing empirical data, it may
be difficult to determine whether the employment of any particular in
terrogation tactic would be likely, in isolation, to produce an untrust
worthy confession.
Despite these difficulties, it is preferable to establish clear princi
ples to guide the police and lower courts in determining whether an
interrogation tactic is pernicious. If particular interrogation tactics
have a strong tendency to produce untrustworthy confessions when
employed in the context of a typically intense interrogation, those tac
tics should be closely regulated. Starting with this premise, I will con
sider three interrogation tactics that have considerable potential for
producing untrustworthy statements. The pre-Miranda due process
test provided some restrictions on each of these practices. In order to
provide appropriate safeguards against the use of these interrogation
practices during post-waiver interrogations, however, the restrictions
must be revived and strengthened.
A.

Threats ofPunishment and Promises of Leniency

At common law, confessions induced by any threat or promise
were excluded as unreliable.122 This exclusionary principle was
121. See, e.g., White, Involuntary Confession, supra note 42, at 2049 (arguing that "em
pirical data showing a relationship between lengthy interrogation and false or untrustworthy
confessions" supports the conclusion that confessions obtained "after more than six hours"
of continuous interrogation should be automatically excluded).
122. See 3 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 103, § 836, at 275.
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adopted in America during the nineteenth century. In 1896, R ussell on
Crimes, a leading criminal law treatise, asserted that, in order to be
admissible, a confession could not be obtained by any direct or im
plied promise.123 One year later, in Bram v. United States,124 the
Supreme Court adopted this rule as a matter of constitutional law,
holding that the admission of a confession induced by "any direct or
implied promise, however slight,"125 violated the Fifth Amendment
privilege.
Over the next century, Bram exerted only limited influence. In ap
plying the pre-Miranda voluntariness test, the Court never rigorously
applied Bram's prohibition. In one case, it held that a confession that
occurred after the defendant negotiated "a bargain with the police and
the parole officers" was valid;126 in two other cases, it held that confes
sions induced by threats of harsh punishment and express or implied
promises of significant leniency were involuntary127 but did not specify
that the threats or promises were sufficient in themselves to dictate ei
ther result.128 In the post-Miranda case of Arizona v. Fulminante,129 the
Court expressly repudiated Bram's holding prohibiting confessions in
duced by any promises, stating that that rule "does not state the stan
dard for determining the voluntariness of a confession."130
Fulminante's limitation of Bram nevertheless leaves open the pos
sibility of barring confessions induced by promises that are substan
tially likely to produce untrustworthy confessions. As Wigmore ob
served, the premise that confessions produced by any promises are
untrustworthy was probably never correct.131 If the inducement to con
fess is relatively slight - a promise that the officer will testify that the
123. See 3 WILLIAM 0LDNALL RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND
MISDEMEANORS 478 (Horace Smith & A.P. Perceval Keep eds., 6th ed. 1896) [hereinafter
RUSSELL ON CRIMES].
124. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
125. Id. at 542-43 (quoting 3 RUSSELL ON CRIMES 478 (6th ed.)).
126. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 185 (1953).
127. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
128. In Leyra, the interrogator told the suspect he would have "a much better chance" if
he "play[ed] ball" with the interrogators, and that " [t]hese people are going to throw the
book at you unless you can show that in a fit of temper, you got so angry that you did it.
Otherwise they toss premeditation in and it's premeditation. See?" Leyra, 347 U.S. at 583-84
(Appendix to Opinion of the Court). In holding the defendant's confe ssion involuntary, the
Court referred to the interrogator's "threat[s]" and "promise[s] of leniency." Id. at 559. In
Lynumn, the interrogator told the defendant that if she did not confess she could get ten
years and her children would be taken away and that if she did confess the interrogator
would recommend mercy and see that she kept her children. 372 U.S. at 531-32. In a terse
opinion, the Court held that the interrogator's statements to the defendant rendered her
confession involuntary. Id. at 534.
129. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
130. Id. at 285.
131. See 3 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 103, § 836, at 238.
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suspect cooperated,132 for example - there is little reason to believe
that a suspect will respond with a false confession.
The likelihood that a promise will produce a false confession is
substantially greater, however, when an interrogator promises a sus
pect that, if he confesses, he will not be charged at all or will be
granted leniency. Based on the advice provided in the leading interro
gation manual, one of the interrogator's goals is to convince the sus
pect that the police either already have or will be able to obtain evi
dence that establishes the suspect's guilt.133 In this context, an innocent
suspect might rationally conclude that confessing in exchange for a
promise of leniency is in his best interest. After hearing the police re
peatedly state that they have or will have evidence of his guilt, the
suspect might believe that, if he does not confess, the police intend ei
ther to frame him for a crime he did not commit or to present genuine
evidence that could result in conviction despite his innocence. An in
nocent suspect might thus believe that a false confession in exchange
for leniency is his best alternative.
Recent empirical data support the conclusion that threats of pun
ishment and promises of leniency sometimes produce false confes
sions. In their analysis of sixty proven or probable false confessions,
Professors Richard A. Leo and Richard J. Ofshe identified this tactic
as one that played a major role in precipitating several false confes
sions. In one case, for example, a seventeen-year-old suspect falsely
confessed to stabbing her mother after an interrogator told her she
would die in the electric chair if she maintained her innocence.134 And
in another, a young woman falsely confessed to shoving her boyfriend
off a trail 320 feet above the Oregon coast after the police "creat[ ed]
the impression that her admission . . . carried no punishment."135
Both empirical data and precedent thus support imposing a prohi
bition on inducing confessions through threats or promises. Since the
prohibition's underlying purpose is to bar threats or promises that are
substantially likely to produce untrustworthy confessions, the test
should focus on the suspect's interpretation of the interrogator's words
rather than on whether the interrogator's words constitute an explicit
threat or a binding promise. When the suspect would be likely to in
terpret the interrogator's words as constituting a threat of serious ad
verse consequences if he doesn't confess or a promise of significant le
niency if he does, empirical data as well as intuition suggest that even
an innocent suspect will be quite likely to confess rather than risk the
132. See, e.g., State v. Fuqua, 152 S.E.2d 68, 72 (N.C. 1967) (excluding confession be
cause officer told suspect he would testify that the suspect cooperated with the investiga
tion).
133. lNBAU ET AL., supra note 85, at 131.
134. See Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 65, at 475-76.
1 35. Id. at 470-71 .
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consequences of maintaining his innocence. To impose a restriction
that will provide adequate protection against inducements that are
substantially likely to produce untrustworthy confessions, interroga
tors should thus be prohibited from making statements (or engaging in
conduct) that would be likely to lead the suspect to believe that he will
suffer serious adverse consequences if he doesn't confess or be
granted significant leniency if he does.
Adopting this rule will not adversely affect law enforcement. The
leading interrogation manuals admonish interrogators to refrain from
inducing confessions through threats or promises of leniency.136 Thus
interrogators who scrupulously adhere to the manuals' recommenda
tions will not violate this rule. Moreover, the scope of the rule is lim
ited. Promises to testify to the suspect's cooperation137 or to inform the
prosecuting attorney of such cooperation138 would be permitted. Simi
larly, statements to the effect that confession will make the suspect
feel better or be good for his soul would not necessarily be impermis
sible. The benefits offered by such promises seem either too insubstan
tial or too collateral to the criminal litigation to be likely to induce an
untrustworthy confession.
Determining whether an interrogator is threatening the suspect
with a punishment if he doesn't confess or promising him significant
leniency if he does will sometimes be difficult. As Professor Philip
Johnson has said, "the difference between expressions of compassion
ate understanding on the one hand, and implied promises of leniency
on the other, is at the margins sometimes a matter of emphasis and
nuance."139 Similarly, a fine line will sometimes exist between implied
threats and statements that merely suggest the possibility of adverse
consequences.
In determining whether an interrogator's statements to the suspect
constitute a prohibited threat or promise, an objective standard which considers the probable perceptions of both the interrogator and
the suspect subjected to interrogation - should be adopted. If the in
terrogator should be aware that either the suspect or a reasonable per
son in the suspect's position would perceive that the interrogator's
statements indicate that the suspect would be likely to receive signifi136. See, e.g., INBAU ET AL., supra note 85, at 114 ("In applying this technique of con
demning the accomplice, the interrogator must proceed cautiously and must refrain from
making any comments to the effect that the blame cast on an accomplice thereby relieves the
suspect of legal responsibility for his part in the commission of the offense.").
137. See supra note 132.
138. See, e.g. , Layne v. State, 542 So. 2d 237, 239 (Miss. 1989) (holding that promise to
inform prosecuting attorney that the suspect was cooperating did not render suspect's con
fession involuntary). See generally George E. Dix, Promises, Confessions, and Wayne
LaFave's Bright Line Analysis, 1 993 U. ILL. L. REV. 207 [hereinafter Dix, Promises].
1 39. Philip E. Johnson, A Statutory Replacement for the Miranda Doctrine, 24 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 303, 310-1 1 (1 986).
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cant leniency if he did confess or significant adverse consequences if
he didn't, then the interrogator's statements should be viewed as im
proper and a confession occurring as a result of such statements
should be excluded as involuntary.
Examples drawn from two cases illustrate how the test should be
applied. In Miller v. Fenton, 1 40 Detective Boyce, who was investigating
the murder of seventeen-year-old Deborah Margolin, interrogated
Frank Miller for approximately one hour. During the course of the in
terrogation, Boyce repeatedly suggested to Miller that, if he confessed,
Boyce would see to it that he received "help" rather than being
treated as a criminal. At one point, for example, Boyce told Miller that
the person responsible for the killing was "not a criminal. "141 He went
on to say that the perpetrator had "[a] problem, and a good thing
about that Frank, is a problem can be rectified. "142 After Miller
agreed, Boyce developed his implicit proposal to Miller as follows: "I
want to help you. I mean I really want to help you, but you know what
they say, God helps those who help themselves, Frank."143
Boyce was never explicit about the kind of "help" that he hoped to
provide for Miller. At one point, however, he asked Miller, "If I
promise to, you know, do all I can with the psychiatrist and everything,
and we get the proper help for you, . . . will you talk to me about it?"144
Miller never answered this question,145 and some of his responses to
Boyce indicated that, despite Boyce's statements, he believed he
would be treated as a criminal if he confessed.146 Nevertheless, Miller
eventually confessed to the killing.
Under the proposed approach, the first question is whether Boyce
should be aware that a reasonable person in Miller's position would
believe that, if he confessed, he would be likely to receive significant
leniency. Although Boyce never explicitly promised Miller leniency in
exchange for a confession, his statements taken as a whole would cer
tainly suggest to a reasonable person that if he "helped" Boyce by
confessing to the crime, he would not be treated as a criminal, but
rather would receive the psychiatric help he needed. The promise of
psychiatric help (presumably at a mental hospital) rather than pun
ishment as a criminal certainly constitutes a promise of significant le140. 796 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 989 (1986).
141. Id. at 618 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 622.
145. His immediate response,
terrupted by Boyce. Id.

"I

can't talk to you about something I'm not . . . " was in

146. See id. at 633 (Appendix) (After Boyce said, " I don't think you're a criminal,
Frank," Miller responded, "No, but you're trying to make me one.").

·
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niency. Boyce's statements to Miller thus constituted an improper
promise.
Should Miller's confession following Boyce's promise be excluded
as involuntary? Based on the statements he made to Boyce, Miller did
not appear to believe that he would receive psychiatric treatment
rather than being treated as a "criminal" if he confessed. The govern
ment might thus claim that, even if Boyce made an improper promise,
Miller's confession should not be excluded as involuntary because
Boyce's promise did not induce the confession.147
In determining whether a promise induced a confession, the focus
should be on whether the promise played any part in precipitating the
confession. If Miller did not believe that Boyce had made a promise or
was certain that whatever promise Boyce made would not be kept,
Miller's confession should be admitted. Miller's skepticism as to
Boyce's intentions should not be sufficient, however, to negate a
finding that the promise induced the confession. Even if Miller be
lieved that Boyce was unlikely to honor his implied promise, he might
have been induced by the promise to believe there was "a small open
window at the top of [a] long wall"148 through which he could miracu
lously escape the possibility of punishment. In the context of custodial
interrogation, a suspect can be induced to confess by a promise even
when he believes there is only a remote chance that the terms of the
promise will be fulfilled.
Indeed, when a suspect's confession follows a promise of leniency,
the conclusion that the promise did not induce the confession is gener
ally implausible. Even if the suspect is aware that he is grasping at
straws, the promise probably played some part in precipitating the
confession. Barring unusual circumstances, such as an explicit clarifi
cation of the officer's authority to make promises,149 a confession fol
lowing such a promise should be viewed as induced by the promise
and, therefore, involuntary.150 Since Miller's confession followed
Boyce's implied promise of leniency, his confession should be ex
cluded.
As a second example, consider the interrogation of Leo Bruce,
who was suspected of murdering nine people at a Thai Buddhist Tem
ple west of Phoenix, Arizona. After his arrest, Bruce was questioned
by several officers, including FBI Agent Casey.151 Near the beginning
1 47. In Miller, the majority opinion took this position. 796 F.2d at 61 1-12.
148. See DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE 209 (1991 ).
149. If, in response to a request for clarification, Boyce told Miller that he had no
authority to make a promise that would be binding on the prosecutor, it could be found ei
ther that Boyce made no implied promise of leniency or that the promise he did make did
not induce Miller's confession.
1 50. Accord Dix, Promises, supra note 138, at 259.
151. See Roger Parloff, False Confessions, AM. LAW., May, 1 993, at 58.
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of the interrogation, Casey falsely told Bruce that the police had evi
dence showing that he was at the temple on the night of the killings.
After Bruce denied ever being there, Casey said to him, "The best
thing to do is to cooperate now. . . . Don't you think it's smart to get
your version of the story down . . . before everybody else gives
theirs?"152 When Bruce continued to deny he had been at the temple,
Casey told Bruce that, if he stuck with that story, he was "gonna end
up being sorry, I think."153 He added, "You're making a mistake by
not cooperating at this point."154 Bruce continued to deny his involve
ment. Eventually, however, he confessed to the killings.155
In this case, the critical question is whether Casey should have
been aware that a reasonable person in Bruce's situation would be
lieve that he was being threatened with significant adverse conse
quences if he didn't confess. Casey's comments suggesting that it
would be "smart" for Bruce to get his story down before other sus
pects gave theirs could not reasonably be interpreted as communicat
ing such a threat. The comments do, of course, suggest that Bruce will
obtain some advantage by admitting his involvement so that he can get
his "version of the story down" first. But there is no suggestion that
getting his version down first will lead to any concrete benefit relating
to the disposition of his case. At most, Casey's comments seem to sug
gest that if Bruce tells his story before the others tell theirs, the
authorities will be more likely to believe his story, thus making it less
likely that other suspects will later be able to convince the authorities
that Bruce is more blameworthy than his statement indicates.
Casey's additional statement to the effect that Bruce "will end up
being sorry" if he doesn't cooperate obviously comes closer to articu
lating a threat. Arguably, a reasonable person might take this lan
guage to mean that serious adverse consequences would accrue to him
if he failed to comply with the Agent's suggestion that he "cooperate"
through making a statement admitting his involvement. On the other
hand, when considered in the context of Casey's other statements, the
suggestion that Bruce would be "sorry" if he didn't make a statement
might more reasonably be interpreted as merely reinforcing the sug
gestion contained in the earlier statements: if Bruce didn't provide the
police with his own inculpatory statement, he might later regret his
failure to cooperate because the police would then be more inclined to
believe other suspects' statements incriminating Bruce. Even though
the words, "You'll end up being sorry," have an ominous ring, they are
152. Id. at 59.
153. Id. at 60.
154. Id.
155. Id. Bruce was never brought to trial, however, because subsequently discovered
evidence established that his confession was false. Id.
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not on the same order as, "You'll lose your chance for being treated as
a lesser offender," or other words that might suggest that the failure to
cooperate would lead to tangible consequences relating to sentencing
or disposition of the case.
Although the question is close, Agent Casey's statements to Bruce
should not be interpreted as communicating a threat that his failure to
confess would lead to adverse consequences. Accordingly, Bruce's
confession should not be involuntary on the ground that it was in
duced by an improper threat or promise.
B.

Threats of Adverse Consequences to a Friend o r Loved One

In pre-Miranda due process cases, the Court's view of police trick
ery was ambivalent. In a few cases - most notably, Spano v. New
York156 - the Court indicated that police trickery was a factor con
tributing to its conclusion that the suspect's confession was involun
tary .157 The Court never indicated, however, that any particular sort of
police trickery would be sufficient by itself to render a confession in
voluntary. Indeed, in Frazier v. Cupp,158 the Court held that a confes
sion induced by trickery that both misrepresented the strength of the
evidence against the suspect159 and minimized the suspect's culpability
for the offense160 was voluntary.161 While stating that the interrogating
officer's trickery was "relevant" under the due process test, it con
cluded that the trickery was insufficient to render the confession in
voluntary.162

156. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
157. See id. at 322-23. In Spano, the suspect's childhood friend, who was then a police
officer, falsely told the suspect that his job would be in jeopardy if the suspect did not con
fess. The Court condemned this tactic, observing that it was "a factor" that in conjunction
with other factors resulted in an involuntary confession. See id. at 323. In Leyra v. Denno,
347 U.S. 556, 559 (1954), the defendant, who was suffering from painful sinus headaches,
requested the assistance of a doctor. The chief interrogator introduced him to a doctor who
was supposed to provide the defendant with medical relief. See id. In fact, however, the
"doctor" who met with the defendant "was not a general practitioner but a psychiatrist with
considerable knowledge of hypnosis." Id. Instead of providing the defendant with medical
relief, the "psychiatrist by subtle and suggestive questioning simply continued the police ef
fort . . . to induce [the suspect] to admit his guilt." Id. In holding the suspect's confession in
voluntary, the Court treated this trickery as an important factor in the totality of circum
stances. See id.
158. 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
159. The interrogating officer falsely told the defendant that his confeder�te had con
fessed. See id. at 737.
160. The officer also "sympathetically suggested that the victim had started a fight by
making homosexual advances." Id. at 738.
161. See id. at 739.
162. See id.
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Although the Court's dicta in Spano which strongly condemned
the deceptive tactics employed in that case163 - seemed to suggest that
some types of police trickery are worse than others, the Court has
never articulated any basis for evaluating the propriety of particular
types of interrogators' trickery. Based on the concern for prohibiting
interrogation tactics that are substantially likely to produce untrust
worthy statements, the Court should distinguish between different
forms of trickery on the basis of whether or not the trickery has the
potential for producing a false confession. This approach is consistent
with Spano because, as lower courts have pointed out, 164 the type of
trickery employed in that case did have the potential for precipitating
a false confession.
In Spano, Bruno, the defendant's childhood friend and a "fledg
ling" police officer, falsely told the defendant that the defendant's
failure to confess would cause him to lose his job as a police officer,
resulting in dire consequences not only for himself but also for his wife
and children. Bruno's trickery could be classified as informing the sus
pect that a friend or loved one will suffer adverse consequences unless
the suspect confesses. Both intuition and empirical data165 suggest that
this type of trickery does have substantial potential for precipitating
false confessions. In the context of a police interrogation,, a suspect
might easily be led to feel that protecting his friend or loved one from
imminent harm is more important than the future consequences of
confessing. Based on an appropriate reading of Spano, interrogators
should thus be prohibited from informing a suspect that his failure to
confess will lead to serious adverse consequences for a friend or loved
one.
If this prohibition is adopted, how should a court determine
whether an interrogator is making a prohibited threat? Since the pro
hibition is designed to deter a pernicious interrogation practice, the
court's ultimate focus should be on the interrogator.166 In assessing
-

163. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959).
164. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. DuPree, 275 A.2d 326, 327 (Pa. 1971) (citing Spano as
an example in which "police employ threats likely .to produce a false, involuntary confes
sion").
165. In at least one of Leo and Ofshe's collection of "proven" false c<;mfession cases, this
tactic seems to have played a critical part in producing a false confession. During Dante
'
Parker's interrogation, the police indicated to Parker that if he didn't confess, the police
would arrest and humiliate Parker's brothers, T.C. and Peter. One officer articulated the
threat as follows: "They're gonna hit that house big time, T.C.'s gonna go down right in front
of his kids.''. Ofshe & Leo, Social Psychology, supra note 24, at.230. According to Ofshe and
Leo, this "threat precipitated Parker's false confession, and he began the process of invent
ing answers to the interrogators' questions." Id.
166. Adopting an objective focus for the purpose of determining whether an interroga
tion practice is impermissible is consistent with the Court's approach in dealing with other
interrogation issues. See, e.g. , Berkemer v. McCarthy, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984) (whether sus
pect was in custody within the meaning of Miranda must be determined by assessing "how a
reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation"); Rhode
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particular inducements, a reasonable interrogator's perception of how
the suspect would view the inducement would be critical. If a reason
able interrogator would believe that his inducement would cause the
suspect to feel that he was confronted with the alternatives of con
fessing or causing serious adverse consequences for a friend or loved
one, the interrogator's inducement should be impermissible.
If an interrogator tells the suspect, for example, that the police will
take his wife or friend into custody if he doesn't confess, the question
of whether this constitutes a threat of serious adverse consequences to
the suspect's wife or friend should be determined on the basis of the
interrogator's perception of how the suspect would be likely to view
this statement. If the interrogator knows that the suspect's wife suffers
from arthritis, 167 then the interrogator should certainly be aware that
the suspect would be likely to believe that the interrogator was trying
to induce a confession by threatening his wife with serious adverse
consequences. Similarly, if the interrogator had reason to believe that
the suspect would be likely to believe that taking a person into custody
amounts to an arrest or other serious curtailment of liberty, then the
statement that his wife or a friend is going to be taken into custody
should qualify as an impermissible threat, regardless of his wife's or
friend's physical condition.
Since the interrogation tactic is problematic because of its potential
for producing untrustworthy statements, it should not matter in theory
whether the interrogator is misrepresenting his intentions when he
tells a suspect that his failure to confess will lead to consequences for a
third party. In practice, however, when the interrogator is lying to the
suspect, there would seem to be a much greater likelihood that the in
terrogator believes that the suspect would perceive that, if he doesn't
confess, his friend or loved one would suffer serious adverse conse
quences. In most instances, therefore, the interrogator's misrepresen
tation as to the effect that a suspect's failure to confess would have for
a third party should be strong evidence that the interrogator is em
ploying an impermissible interrogation practice.
·

C.

Misrepresenting the Evidence Against the Suspect

Misrepresenting the strength of the evidence against the suspect is
another interrogation tactic that has the potential for producing false
confessions. When confronted with an interrogator's claim that the
evidence overwhelmingly establishes his guilt, some suspects will be
inclined to believe either that continued resistance is futile (because
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (interrogation includes "words or actions on the part
of the police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect").
167. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 536 (1961).
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the police have evidence that will convict him despite his innocence)
or that he is in fact guilty. Not every such misrepresentation, however,
is likely to produce untrustworthy statements. If the police tell a sus
pect they are confident they will find evidence establishing his guilt, or
even that they have witnesses who will testify against him, an innocent
suspect would be unlikely to confess. Even assuming he credits the in
terrogator's statements, he would be inclined to believe that the police
or the witnesses are simply mistaken. On the other hand, if the inter
rogator shows the suspect a fabricated laboratory report indicating
that the suspect's semen stains were found on the victim's under
wear,168 an innocent suspect might rationally conclude that the gov
ernment's irrefutable (even if mistaken) proof of his guilt mandates
his confession.
When should the tactic of misrepresenting the evidence against the
suspect be impermissible? In view of the concern for prohibiting inter
rogation tactics substantially likely to produce untrustworthy state
ments, the test should be whether the interrogators employed a tactic
that would be likely to induce the suspect to believe that the evidence
against him is so overwhelming that continued resistance is futile.
When this test is met, there is a substantial risk that the suspect will
simply make the statements sought by the interrogator, regardless of
whether those statements are true. In determining whether this test is
met, the court should consider the type of evidence misrepresented,
the nature and quality of the misrepresentation, the extent to which
the misrepresented evidence seems to establish the suspect's guilt, and
the suspect's apparent vulnerability.
Misrepresentations relating to forensic or scientific evidence are
particularly likely to convince suspects that further resistance is futile.
Most people believe that evidence obtained through accepted scien
tific procedures - fingerprints, ballistic reports, or DNA evidence, for
example - is not only reliable, but irrefutable. Empirical data support
this conclusion. Based on their examination of false confession cases,
Ofshe and Leo report that "false evidence ploys based on scientific
procedures" are more likely than " [f]alse evidence ploys based on
eyewitness reports" to induce an innocent person to confess falsely.169
Both intuition and the available empirical data thus suggest that mis
representing the forensic or scientific evidence against the suspect

168. See State v. Cayward, 552 So. 2d 971, 972 (1989).
169. Ofshe & Leo, Social Psychology, supra note 24, at 202. As the authors state,
" [f]alse scientific evidence can be presented so as to leave little opportunity for counters.
Interrogators represent positive results of fingerprint, hair or DNA tests as error free and
therefore unimpeachable." Id. Effective use of. this ploy diminishes the suspect's ability to
resist the interrogator's insistence on his guilt.
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should in some circumstances be an impermissible interrogation tactic
because of its potential for producing untrustworthy statements.170
Because scientific evidence has an inordinate potential for con
vincing a suspect that continued resistance is futile, misrepresenting
the scientific evidence against the suspect should be impermissible
whenever the misrepresented evidence would be sufficient to establish
the suspect's guilt. Under this test, interrogators should certainly be
barred from fabricating laboratory reports indicating that semen stains
on the victim's underwear came from the suspect. Since, in most cases,
manufacturing a false report would not be necessary to convince a
suspect of the scientific evidence's validity, falsely informing the sus
pect of scientific evidence sufficient to establish his guilt - telling him,
for example, that his fingerprints were found at the scene of the
crime 171 or that his shoes matched tracks left by the perpetrator172 should also be impermissible. In both instances the interrogator's
statements would be likely to lead an innocent suspect to believe that
irrefutable proof of his guilt mandated his confession.
The tactic of falsely informing a suspect that he has failed a poly
graph test presents a more difficult issue. An interrogator employing
this tactic is misrepresenting scientific evidence; but the deception
does not suggest to the suspect that the police will be able to present
irrefutable proof of his guilt. A knowledgeable suspect would pre
sumably be aware that polygraph results can be mistaken and that
such results are not admissible in court. Nevertheless, empirical data
indicate that this form of deception can have a powerful impact on in
nocent suspects. The Leo-Ofshe study of false confession cases indi
cates that, in at least two cases, 173 misrepresenting polygraph results
played a major role not only in precipitating an innocent suspect's con
fession but also in leading the suspect to believe, at least temporarily,
that he was in fact guilty.
Since the constitutional prohibition should only apply to exclude
interrogation tactics substantially likely to produce untrustworthy
statements, the tactic of misrepresenting polygraph results should
170. In Cayward, the court distinguished between verbal misrepresentations and "manu
facturing false documents" for the purpose of misrepresenting the strength of the govern
ment's case, stating that neither the suspect's nor the public's expectations "encompass the
notion that the police will knowingly fabricate tangible documentation or physical evidence
against an individual." 552 So. 2d at 974. In particular, the court expressed the concern that
"[a] report falsified for interrogation purposes might well be retained and filed in police pa
perwork," with the result that they might unintentionally "be admitted as substantive evi
dence against the defendant." Id. at 974-75.
171. But see Beasley v. United States, 512 A.2d 1007, 1010 (D.C. 1986) (admitting con
fession).
172. But see State v. Jackson, 304 S.E.2d 134, 144 (N.C. 1983) (admitting confession).
173. The two cases involved Peter Reilly, who falsely confessed to killing his mother,
and Tom Sawyer, who falsely confessed to killing a young woman who lived near him. For a
discussion of these cases, see White, False Confessions, supra note 82, at 128.
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probably not be absolutely prohibited. As this example indicates,
however, any tactic that distorts the suspect's perception of the scien
tific or forensic evidence relating to his participation in the crime does
have some tendency to precipitate a false or untrustworthy statement.
When such a tactic is employed, the court should at least closely scru
tinize both the circumstances of the interrogation and the apparent
vulnerability of the suspect, examining the extent to which the misrep
resentation would be likely to precipitate an untrustworthy confession.
When the tactic has been employed on a youthful or mentally handi
capped suspect, for example, a court should conclude that the interro
gator's use of the tactic rendered the suspect's confession involuntary.
In determining whether a particular misrepresentation of govern
ment evidence will be impermissible, the extent and nature of the mis
representation is also significant. In Miranda, the Court disapproved
of the "reverse line-up" tactic. In a reverse line-up, the "accused is
placed in a line-up" and then falsely "identified by several fictitious
witnesses or victims who associated him with different offenses." 1 74
When police employ this tactic, there is obviously a concern that even
innocent suspects "will become desperate and confess to the offense
under investigation in order to escape from the false accusations."175
If, rather than conducting a "reverse line-up," the police simply ar
ranged to have a number of fictitious witnesses dramatically identify
the suspect as the perpetrator of the crime under investigation, the
tactic should still be impermissible. Even though suspects can be ex
pected to know that witnesses are often mistaken, the power of the
false evidence - in terms of both its apparent value to the prosecution
and its vivid communication to the suspect - could easily convince an
innocent suspect that continued resistance would be futile.
Although the test may prove difficult to apply, it should promote
distinctions between reasonable and pernicious police practices. In
Leo Bruce's interrogation, for example, the police took Bruce to a
property room, showing him "photographs of enlarged fingerprints
and other items of trace evidence, a floor plan of the temple, and a
chart listing the names of Bruce's alleged associates."176 If Bruce's in
terrogators had falsely indicated that Bruce's fingerprints were found
at the crime scene, this interrogation tactic should be impermissible. If,
on the other hand, they falsely asserted that the forensic evidence,
such as the fingerprints, established the guilt of Bruce's alleged associ
ates, but they said nothing about whether it established Bruce's par
ticipation, the tactic should be permissible.
174. 384 U.S. at 453 (quoting O'HARA, FuNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
106 (1956)).

175. Id.
176. Parloff, supra note 151, at 60.
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Classifying the interrogation tactic will not always be clear. If the
police in the Bruce case not only indicated that the forensic evidence
established the guilt of Bruce's alleged associates, but also stated (or
intimated) that those associates were incriminating Bruce, the case
would fall in the gray area. In determining whether this type of mis
representation would be likely to convince an innocent suspect that
further resistance was futile, a court would have to assess not only the
exact nature of the misrepresentation, but also other factors - in
cluding the vividness with which the misrepresentation was made and
the suspect's apparent powers of resistance. If, during the course of a
lengthy interrogation, the interrogator repeatedly falsely indicated to
the suspect that others whose.guilt was established were unequivocally
implicating him, the court should probably hold that the interrogation
tactic was impermissible on the ground that it would be likely to con
vince even an innocent suspect that further resistance to the interroga
tor would be futile.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In many ways, Miranda is a paradoxical decision. Among the
Supreme Court's criminal procedure decisions, it has precipitated the
most controversy and debate. As the Dickerson majority stated,
moreover, the Miranda "warnings have become a part of our national
culture."177 Nevertheless, as interpreted by the post-Miranda Court,
the extent to which Miranda's safeguards protect suspects from perni
cious interrogation practices is extremely limited.
By requiring the police to warn suspects of their constitutional
rights before subjecting them to custodial interrogation, Miranda does
provide suspects with at least a theoretical opportunity to avoid inter
rogation or to halt it after it begins by invoking one of their rights. In
practice, however, the vast majority of suspects waive their Miranda
rights and submit to interrogation. Once the interrogation begins, the
suspect's awareness of his rights fails to provide significant protection
from pressures generated by sophisticated interrogators. Interrogators
have the ability to structure the interrogation in such a way that the
suspect will be deterred from successfully invoking his rights.
In addition, Miranda provides virtually no restrictions on the inter
rogation practices police are permitted to employ once the suspect
waives his rights and submits to an interrogation. Indeed, Miranda
may have had the unintended effect of reducing the extent to which
the due process voluntariness test provides protection against such in
terrogation practices. As a result, although the Court has indicated

177. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (2000).
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that interrogation practices viewed as pernicious by society are pro
hibited, constitutional restrictions on such practices are minimal.
In order to address this problem, the Court first needs to deter
mine what interrogation practices should be viewed as pernicious, and
then to develop constitutional principles that will prohibit or restrain
such practices. In this Article, I have argued that the Court should re
furbish the due process voluntariness test so as to prohibit interroga
tion practices that are substantially likely to produce untrustworthy
, statements. By taking this approach, the Court will not only fill a sig
nificant gap left by Miranda but also come closer to insuring that "the
terrible engine of the criminal law . . . not be used to overreach indi
viduals who stand helpless against it."178

178. Culombe
ion).

v.

Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., plurality opin

